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RECENT DECISIONS
Fiduciary Administration-Retention of Investments and the
Duty to Diversify: In Will of Mueller' the testator, as sole stock-
holder of Mueller Furnace Co., left shares of stock in the corporation
in two testamentary trusts with the income of the first of these trusts
to go to his widow for life and the corpus on her death to her chil-
dren. The second testamentary trust was for the benefit of the children
of a deceased son. The appellant, testator's son by a previous marriage,
and the widow were named co-trustees of both of these trusts. Under
another article of the testator's will, the appellant received some shares
outright. Several years after the death of the testator, the appellant
declared himself trustee of an inter vivos trust funded by some of the
shares he had received outright-with the income to his father's widow
for life and the remainder to her children.
In 1954 Mueller Furnace was merged into the Worthington Cor-
poration, a large national corporation. As a result of the merger, all
of the Mueller Furnace stock was exchanged for Worthington com-
mon stock. Thus. Worthington stock became the sole asset of each of the
three trusts and remained so until 1963 when all of it was sold.
When the appellant petitioned the court for an approval of ac-
counts for each of the trusts, objections were made by the beneficiaries
of all of the trusts, including the widow who was also co-trustee under
the two testamentary trusts. The trial court concluded that the trustees
of the testamentary trusts and the trustee of the inter vivos trust should
have diversified the investments within a reasonable time after a 1958
approval of accounts for the testamentary trusts, and that the trustees
should have disposed of 80 percent of the Worthington stock in Oc-
tober or November of 1961. The court then surcharged the trustee
of the two testamentary trusts, required the appellant-trustee to in-
demnify his co-trustee stepmother in full, and surcharged the appellant
for the loss to the corpus of the inter vivos trust.
The theory of the trial court was that the appellant had failed to
exercise prudence in light of his special knowledge. Such knowledge
stemmed from the fact that the appellant, who had been president of
Mueller before the merger, had been appointed a vice president and
director of Worthington, and therefore he should have been aware of
the anti-trust actions in the electrical industry and the profit squeeze
in the capital goods industry during 1961. The conclusive fact which
seemed to convince the court that the appellant had failed to act pru-
dently was that the appellant had sold some of his personal holdings
of Worthington stock in 1961 with knowledge of the "squeeze" and
1 28 Wis. 2d 26, 135 N.W. 2d 854 (1965).
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"antitrust actions" without selling any of the stock held by the trusts
or informing his co-trustee of the sale of his own stock.
In upholding the trial court's finding generally (though not with
regard to the indemnification of the co-trustee), the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court first looked to statutory law. Chapter 3202 is the trust
fund investment statute; but, since it was completely revised in 1959,3
the first question is whether the post-1959 or the pre-1959 statutes
apply to the case. Since the action was commenced in 1963, presumably
the statutory law in effect at that time would govern. Further, present
law provides that:
The provisions of this chapter shall govern fiduciaries, including
executors, administrators, guardians, and trustees acting under
will, agreements, court orders and other instruments now existing
or hereafter made. 4 (Emphasis added.)
Because the case dealt with the duty of the trustees regarding the re-
tention of investments, it would seem a reasonable construction under
section 320.06 to apply the post-1959 statutes.
However, the application of pre-1959 statutes would not be com-
pletely without foundation since present law also states:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall affect any investment
made prior to the enactment hereof or any amendment hereof
or affect any rights or interests established, accrued or created
thereunder or affect any suit or action pending when this chapter
or any amendment hereof becomes effective. 5 (Emphasis added.)
Because the trial court picked October 16, 1958, as the date when the
trustees' duty arose to diversify within a reasonable time, it would be
possible to interpret this to mean that the beneficiaries had a right
established as of that date. If this was the case, then under section
320.04 the pre-1959 statutes would govern.
Another possible reason for the application of pre-1959 statutes
would be that the trial court seemed to apply a pre-1959 statute when
it found that the trustee should have disposed of 80 percent of the
Worthington stock. According to prior law, which was repealed in
1959, investment in any one common stock was limited to 20 percent
of the total trust fund.6 The supreme court, however, did not apply
the pre-1959 statutes. Rather it reasoned that:
Since the trial court concluded that the Worthington stock in
the trusts should have been sold in October or November, 1961,
the provisions of this section [320.02(4), Stats., 1957] were
2 Wis. STAT. ch. 320 (1963).
3 Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 233.
4 WIs. STAT. §320.06 (1963).
5 Wis. STAT. §320.04 (1963).6 Wis. STAT. §320.02(4) (1957).
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not in effect at the time and have no bearing on any legislative
standard of what is prudent.7
Thus, without ever referring to sections 320.04 or 320.06, the
court's holding could be considered consistent with section 320.04 if
the above statement of the court would be interpreted to mean that
no right had been established in the beneficiaries until the time given
the trustees to perform their duty to diversify had run.
After concluding that the post-1959 statutes were to govern, the
next step would be to determine which sections would be applicable
to the three trusts in the case. Section 320.01 deals with the investment
of trust fund assets. The opening language provides that trustee
should invest the trust fund in accordance with the investment pro-
visions of the instrument under which they are acting. Lacking such
provisions, this section sets up standards upon which the trustees are
to act in the investment of the fund. The first subsection sets out the
prudent man standard:
(1) In acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging, retain-
ing, selling and managing property for the benefit of another,
a fiduciary shall exercise the judgment and care under the cir-
cumstances then prevailing, which men of prudence, discretion
and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs,
not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent dis-
position of their funds, considering the probable income as well
as the probable safety of their capital. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, this subsection establishes the general standard for the invest-
ment of trust funds including the situations of exchange and retention.
The second subsection qualifies the first by limiting the holding in
common stock to 50 percent of the total market value of the funds.
This 50 percent rule seems, however, to be limited to the situation of
the initial investment of funds and not their subsequent reinvestment.9
Applying section 320.01 to the case, the two testamentary trusts
7 28 Wis. 2d at 38, 135 N.W. 2d at 861.
S WIs. STAT. §320.01 (1) (1963).
9 Wis. STAT. §320.01(2) (1963): "Nothwithstanding the provisions of sub. (1),
a fiduciary shall not purchase or otherwise invest in common stocks if the
percentage of the fund invested in common stocks immediately after such
purchase or investment will exceed 50 percent of the total market value of
the fund. The preceding sentence shall not be construed (a) to require the
sale or other liquidation of a portion of a fund's holdings of common stocks
even though at any given time the market value of the common stock invest-
ments of the fund exceeds 50 percent of the total market value of the fund,
or (b) to prevent the reinvestment of the proceeds of the sale or other dis-
position of common stocks in other common stocks even though at the time
the market value of the common stock investments of the fund exceed 50
percent of the total market value of the fund. A fiduciary may rely upon
published market quotations as to those investments for which such quota-
tions are available, and upon such valuations of other investments as are
fair and reasonable according to available information."
[Vol. 49
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would seem to come within the opening language because of the broad
powers given the trustees in the instrument:
My trustees shall have power in their discretion to take, re-
ceive, hold, administer, collect, invest, and reinvest the assets of
said trust estates, with full power to bargain, sell, and convey
at such prices and upon such terms as to them may seem best,
or to exchange or otherwise realize upon any or all of the assets
of said trust estates as and when said trustees, in their discre-
tion, deem it advisable. . . . (Emphasis added.)10
Thus the court concluded that "the standards set forth in section
320.01(1) and (2) of the Wisconsin Statutes, do not apply to the
two testamentary trusts in view of the authority vested in the trustee
by the provisions above cited."""
The inter vivos trust instrument did not contain any such invest-
ment provision and so it would seem that the statutory standards of
section 320.01(1) would apply. Further, the 50 percent standard of
section 320.01(2) might be applicable if the exchange of Worthington
stock for the Mueller stock would be interpreted to be within the scope
of "purchase or otherwise invest" as set out in the section. However,
a qualification in section 320.01(2) (b) might be applied to relieve the
trustee of the duty of following the section. That qualification ex-
cludes the reinvestment of the proceeds of the sale or other disposition
of common stock from the 50 percent rule. Thus, if the exchange of
stock is viewed as being within the scope of "reinvestment of the pro-
ceeds," then section 320.01(2) would not apply.
The next section which could possibly apply, although not re-
ferred to by the court, would be section 320.05, which deals specifically
with the retention of securities. 12 It provides that a trustee would not
be required to dispose of any property except upon the discretion of
the trustee, but that this discretion must be exercised at reasonable
intervals. The section would seem applicable to the retention of any
property by a trustee, no matter how the property was acquired. The
problem with this statute is to see how it relates to section 320.01.
10 28 Wis. 2d at 35, 135 N.W. 2d at 859.
11 Id. at 38, 135 N.W. 2d at 861. The court here relied upon In Re Allis's Estate,
123 Wis. 223, 225, 101 N.W. 365, 367 (1904): ". . full power and authority
in their discretion to invest, reinvest . . . ." and Welch v. Welch, 235 Wis.
282, 294 n.1, 290 N.W. 758, 763 n.1, 293 N.W. 150 (1940) : "trustees . . . shall
have full power to grant, bargain, sell, convey . . and to invest and re-invest
the proceeds of any sales ...."
12 WIs. STAT. §320.05(1) (1963): "Unless the trust instrument' or a court order
specifically directs otherwise, a trustee shall not be required to dispose of
any property, real or personal, or mixed, in the estate or trust, however
acquired, until the trustee determines in the exercise of a sound discretion
that it is advisable to dispose of the same; but nothing herein contained shall
excuse the trustee from the duty to exercise discretion at reasonable intervals
and to dete,-ne at such time the advisability of retaining or disposing of
such property."
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Section 320.01 seems to set up a general standard for reinvestment,
including retention, as a prudent man standard while section 320.05
sets up a discretionary standard as a specific exception regarding re-
tention.
If this statute would have been applied to the property acquired
by the exchange of stock in the case, then the trustees would have
had a duty to exercise discretion at reasonable intervals in determining
the advisability of retaining the trust property. Conceivably, a court
could have found that the trustees in this case had breached the trust
by not exercising this discretion at reasonable intervals. However, the
opening language of section 320.05 purports to provide a method for
circumventing the standard set up in the statute. The section begins:
"Unless the trust instrument or a court order specifically directs other-
wise. .. ." Thus, by including some provisions in the trust instrument,
a trustee can be relieved of the duty of following the statute. Exactly
what type of provision would effectively circumvent section 320.05
is not entirely clear, but presumably an unqualified direction to retain
certain investments would prohibit a fiduciary from exercising any
discretion.
There would seem to be no reason why section 320.05 would not
be applicable to the inter vivos trust. Furthermore, even the two testa-
mentary trusts would seem to be within the section because there were
no provisions in the instrument specifically directing retention of
shares received in a stock exchange. Unfortunately, the court did not
refer to section 320.05 and so the decision offers no guidance as to its
scope and application.
Instead of applying section 320.05, the court relied on common
law rules of trust administration. The court quoted the Restatement
(1) concerning the general duty to diversify trust investments, 3 and
(2) the duty of a trustee to dispose of undiversified assets included
in the trust at the time of its creation."- This second rule seems to es-
tablish an unqualified duty to diversify as soon as the trust is created.
Had the court relied on this rule it would have normally found the
duty to diversify to have arose in 1954 as to all of the trusts because
there was no direction to retain anything but the Mueller stock in the
testamentary trust instruments. Presumably, the court felt that it had
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §228 (1959): "Except as otherwise provided
by the terms of the trust, the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to dis-
tribute the risk of loss by a reasonable diversification of investments, unless
under the circumstances it is prudent not to do so."
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §230, comment j (1959): "Diversificationz.
Except as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the trustee is under
a duty to the beneficiary to distribute the risk of loss by disposing of invest-
ments included in the trust at the time of its creation which, although other-
wise proper investments for the trustee to retain, are improper because not
properly diversified."
I[Vol. 49
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to give effect to the 1958 approval of the two testamentary trusts. Be-
cause the court used the language of acting prudentially, they may
well have relied on the first, more general rule of the Restatement.
There seems to be several reasons for the court to apply the com-
mon law rules rather than the statutory rules. First, the trustees of the
two testamentary trusts were relieved of the duty to comply with
section 320.01 because of the investment provisions in the trust in-
strument. However, this did not free the trustees from all duties regard-
ing investment. Rather the court held that the trustees were still re-
quired to act as prudent and provident persons would act under similar
circumstances and that what is prudent is governed by the common
law rules regarding diversification.15 Thus, the trustees are still bound
to a prudent man standard. The only practical effect of the instrument
provisions in the testamentary trusts would seem to be that the trustees
were relieved of the duty of following the 50 percent rule set out in
section 320.01(2) .16
Second, regarding the inter vivos trust, the court initially said that
section 320.01 did apply and thus, the common law rules did not apply.
However, the court then stated:
Since the trial court concluded that the stock in all three trusts
should have been diversified to the extent of 80 percent of the
holding of Worthington, the statutes, even as to the inter vivos
trust, do not control what is prudent, and the determination as to
whether or not the conduct of the appellant was prudent, in the
last analysis, is governed as to all three trusts by the fundamental
rules regarding diversification. 7 (Emphasis added.)
There seems to be two possible explanations of this apparent incon-
sistency. The first is that if section 320.01 is viewed as an incorporation
of the common law prudent man standard, then, regardless of whether
the statute applies or not, the standard is the same."" The second explan-
ation would be that the court was looking for a specific percentage
standard which would establish, as a matter of law, what was prudent.
An example of what they seemed to be looking for would be the 20
percent figure used in the statutes prior to 1959.'9 In the presently ef-
fective statutes the only such standard is the 50 percent standard in
section 320.01 (2). This section, however, seems only to apply to an
initial investment situation and so would not be relevant in the case of
retention.
15 28 Wis. 2d at 36, 135 N.W. 2d at 859. Here the court relies on Welch v,.
Welch, 235 Wis. at 314, 290 N.W. at 772 (1940), and also Estate of Allis, 191
Wis. 23, 33, 209 N.W. 945, 949, 210 N.W. 418 (1926),
16Note, Trusts-Fiduciary Administration-Prudent Man Rule 1960, Wis. L.
REv. 142, discusses section 320.01 and concludes that the statute is a codifica-
tion of the common law prudent man rule.
1728 Wis. 2d at 38, 135 N.W. 2d at 861.
is This reasoning follows the analysis in note 16 supra.
19 WIs. STAT. §320.02(4) (1957).
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Failing to find any set standard in the statutes, the court resorted
to the common law in order to be able to uphold the trial court's finding
that 80 percent of the Worthington stock should have been sold. The
question left unanswered is whether the could could have reached the
same result by applying section 320.05 without ever resorting to the
common law rules.
In conclusion, the Mueller case shows that a broad powers invest-
ment provision in a trust instrument will only relieve a trustee of the
duty of following the 50 percent rule of section 320.01(2). Further, be-
cause the court failed to refer to section 320.05, the scope and applica-
tion of that section, and its relation to the general standard of section
320.01, is left unclear.
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER
